On May 25, North Korea announced and carried out an underground
nuclear test. The yield,
estimated at 2-5 kilotons, was some five times larger than the
earlier partially successful nuclear
explosion carried out in October 2006. The latest test was preceded
by declarations from the North
Korean authorities that they would be forced to test a device to
ensure their security against hostile
acts by the US and its allies. North Korea also carried out a series
of test firings o f short-range
missiles and one unsuccessful intermediate range launcher.
This aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery systems has
destabilised the region and
beyond, and provoked outrage in South Korea, Japan, the US and its
allies. North Korea, with a large
standing army of 1.2 million and artillery capable of destroying
South Korean cities, has sufficient
conventional deterrence to ensure its security. The stationing of US
nuclear weapons in South Korea
and Japan could be a factor behind North Korea’s nuclear posture.
Attempts to develop a nuclear
option at enormous cost aimed at the US seem irrational and
suicidal. Moreover if its missiles have a
high Circular Error Probability (CEP) they would not be effective
against military targets.
The UN Security Council issued a strong non-binding statement,
and is considering a resolution that is
likely to be more strongly worded than Resolution 1718. The options
available are limited to some
form of tighter sanctions, as well as threats to stop and search
vessels going to and from North Korean
ports. This is to prevent transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and related material, as part
of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), outside the
UN framework, and which has not
secured full international support.
North Korea has reacted to these steps and declared itself free from
the armistice agreement of July
1953, which ended the Korean War. It has also said that any attempt
to stop and search North Korean
ships in international waters would be sufficient cause for a war.
This has further raised tensions in the
region, and caused mobilisation of armed forces.
Controversial record
North Korea’s nuclear programme is a long record of controversy. It
has large, high quality uranium
reserves (4 million tonnes, 0.8 per cent uranium content) which,
logically, could be the motive for a
nuclear power programme. During 1980-85 North Korea constructed a
graphite moderated gas-cooled
Magnox type reactor of 5 MWe capacity at the Yongbyon nuclear
research centre, which could use
readily available natural uranium and does not need heavy water.
This reactor is very well suited for producing fissile plutonium
(high Pu-239/Pu-240 ratio) under
certain conditions of low burn-up. Similar reactors were used by the
UK to feed its nuclear weapons
programme and their drawings were declassified.
With this type of reactor, the used fuel rods cannot be kept in
storage for too long under water, due to
corrosion of the cladding; therefore, reprocessing must be done in
time.
The Yongbyon research centre also has a fuel fabrication plant, a
storage facility for spent fuel rods,
and a plutonium reprocessing facility. Thus, all the elements for an
autonomous fuel cycle and
production of fissile plutonium are available to North Korea.
The reactor was apparently operated far below its full power
capacity, a signal of plutonium
production.
Fuel rods are suspected to have been removed during shutdowns in
1989 and 1994. Experts estimate
that by reprocessing them North Korea may have accumulated some 45
kg of fissile plutonium,
suitable for making several nuclear devices. The regime has also
made efforts at developing other
nuclear facilities, such as bigger reactors, and uranium enrichment.
There are signs of tests of
explosives for producing the kind of implosions required for nuclear
weapons.
Compliance disputes
Under international pressure, North Korea acceded to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1985, but the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was
concluded only in 1992. Disputes arose over compliance with IAEA
safeguards, and suspicions of
clandestine fuel rod removals and weapons development activities,
and efforts to implement a 1994
agreement with the US failed. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in
2003, the first country to do so.
Pakistan provided North Korea with materials and technology to
produce highly enriched uranium
(HEU) which can be used in nuclear weapons, in exchange for Nodong
missile systems and
technology. North Korea delivered the missiles during 1997-98, and
Pakistan provided HEU materials
and technologies as late as summer 2002. Dr A. Q. Khan is suspected
to have transferred nuclear
weapons technology, particularly centrifuges, during a series of
visits to North Korea beginning in the
early 1990s.
North Korea has a highly autocratic, opaque militaristic regime, and
has remained disengaged with the
outside world for decades. Only China and, to some extent, Russia
seem to have any real influence
with the regime. After the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, Kim
Jong-Il, his son, who had been groomed
as successor for 22 years, became the Great Leader.
Autocratic regime
Under his leadership, the country became even more autocratic and
centralised. Unlike his father, Kim
Jong-Il demands absolute obedience and agreement, and views any
deviation from his thinking as a
sign of disloyalty. Kim Jong-Il reportedly personally directs even
minor details of state affairs, and is
the focus of an intense personality cult.
His personal peccadilloes, such as western movies and a luxurious,
self-indulgent lifestyle, add a
bizarre dimension.
The coincidence of Kim Jong-Il’s leadership with the development of
the nuclear
and missile programmes is striking. Since late 2008, Kim Jong-Il has
been ailing, reportedly after a
stroke, and his public appearances have been rare. This sparked off
speculation about his successor.
This time, there is no clear succession plan, and there are several
contenders, none of whom have
adequate experience to lead the country. The worst case scenario of
a partially disabled leader and no
clear chain of command seems to be now unfolding. The future of the
regime could be imperilled by
feuding amongst various factions. This sense of uncertainty and
increased insecurity could be the
driver of exaggerated and aggressive responses by North Korea to
actions by its perceived enemies.
Interestingly, North Korea has in the past consistently sought
direct talks with the US and some form
of non-aggression agreement with the US.
The scene seems set for the imposition of comprehensive economic
sanctions by the UN Security
Council, despite hesitation on the part of China and Russia.
Clearly, North Korean actions have left
these countries in an awkward situation. But sanctions can only be
as tight as China and Russia allow
them to be, given their land borders with North Korea. Stringent
sanctions would increase the misery
of the people of North Korea, and perhaps cause an outflow of
refugees.
The Proliferation Security Initiative enables searching of vessels
registered in countries which have
agreed to be part of the PSI and prevent WMD transport. But this
would not apply to North Korean
vessels. One way around would be to have a UNSC-imposed ban on North
Korean vessels calling at
foreign ports unless they subject themselves to inspections. The
situation is delicate and the UNSC has
few viable options.
The North Korean situation could have important consequences for the
issue of Iran’s nuclear
programme and how the UNSC deals with it. It would also prompt a
review of the non-nuclear
postures of Japan and South Korea, and drive them to put in place
the best anti-missile systems.
Reports that Pakistan is adding to its capacity to produce nuclear
weapons is also disturbing.
Over-reaction by the non-proliferation advocates is likely to bring
more calls for adherence to the
NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Clearly, North Korea’s
rattling of the nuclear sabre has
sent shock waves throughout the world.
(The author is a former Ambassador to Cuba and Greece. blfeedback@thehindu.co.in)
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