Blog of Dr. Bhaskar Balakrishnan

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Date:23/01/2009, The Hindu Business Line

Managing Iran’s nuke mission

Bhaskar Balakrishnan


A view of the Arak nuclear project


Iran’s nuclear capability, combined with its hardline posture on Israel and the use of allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah in Palestine and Lebanon, are challenges to Israel and its ally, the US. The Obama administration’s policy towards Iran could have far-reaching consequences for India as well, says BHASKAR BALAKRISHNAN.


One of the priority foreign policy challenges that the new Obama administration will have to tackle is the problem of Iran’s determined pursuit of nuclear capability that will give it a viable nuclear weapons option.

Indeed, Iran’s efforts in this direction have already altered the political and security balance in the entire region, challenging the dominance of the US and its allies. Iran has land borders with Afghanistan as well as Iraq, two crucial areas where the US is embroiled in difficult military operations, and is a vital gateway to Central Asia.

Enriching capacity

To start with, what exactly has Iran accomplished by way of nuclear capability? It has managed to build up significant uranium enrichment capacity at its Natanz plant using centrifuge technology with around 3,000 centrifuges of older P-1 type (similar to those purveyed by A. Q. Khan’s network).

This plant has produced, according to IAEA reports, around 425 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) as on November 2008. Iran has also declared that it is doubling its centrifuge capacity, by end-2008 and raising it further to 9,000 centrifuges in 2009, as well as developing improved centrifuges of greater separation efficiency.

LEU can be used for nuclear power reactors, but needs further enrichment to be converted to highly enriched uranium (HEU) suitable for nuclear weapons. Experts estimate that 700-800 kg of LEU (enriched to 4 per cent U-235) is needed to produce a single nuclear weapon. Iran could, therefore, theoretically produce enough HEU for one nuclear weapon in around three months. Enrichment to HEU would need additional centrifuge capacity or stopping the existing LEU production and large-scale diversion of LEU stocks, which will be tell-tale signs of a breakout from the NPT regime. So far, there is no evidence of Iran diverting LEU for further enrichment.

The other dimension of Iran’s nuclear capability is the 40 MW Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40), under construction (completion scheduled in 2014), which can use natural uranium or LEU for production of plutonium. So far, Iran has completed the heavy water plant (capacity 16 tonnes per year, requirement for start up of IR-40 is around 80 tonnes), but there are no signs of a reprocessing facility coming up.

The IR-40 research reactor and the heavy water plant have recently not been made accessible to IAEA inspectors. Plutonium, which can be produced by heavy water reactors by reprocessing the used fuel, is usable for nuclear weapons. The construction of a reprocessing facility will be a sign of a possible plutonium-based weapons programme.

Missile capability

Along with this, Iran has also developed its missile capability. In November 2008, it tested a two-staged solid fuel missile named Sajji-1 with a range of about 2,000 km. It is developing multiple-stage missiles with greater range. Iran had earlier developed a liquid fuelled Shahab-3 missile with a range of 2,000 km. It has also supplied missiles to Hezbollah and Hamas, along with training assistance.

It is clear from the above that Iran is building up its nuclear capability as far as possible within the NPT framework, and its missile capability, keeping its nuclear options open for various reasons. The Bush administration’s “axis of evil” and “pre-emptive strike” concepts and its attitude to Iran, including no-talks, and sanctions, was perceived as a threat by Iran. The need to deter Israel from a military strike could also be a factor.

Iran’s open nuclear option could also be driven by domestic political compulsions. Nuclear policy is under the control of the “supreme leader”, Ayatollah Khamenei, 69, who, with the backing of key elements within Iran’s religious hierarchy, exerts decisive control over all matters concerning national security. Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa saying the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons was forbidden under Islam can be seen as an indication that while nuclear technology will be pursued, resort to weapons would require a serious contingency.

Military conflict

Iran’s nuclear capability combined with its hardline posture on Israel and use of allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah in Palestine and Lebanon, and its close links with Syria, has already become a direct challenge to Israel and its ally, the US.

To add to this, the region is the source of a large part of world oil and gas resources and there are transit areas such as the Straits of Hormuz which could easily be threatened, cutting off oil and gas shipments, creating havoc on an already depressed global economy.

The timing of the recent conflict between Hamas in Gaza and Israel is also significant, in that it is designed to draw Israel into a long-drawn-out urban guerrilla war that it could find difficult to sustain. This situation would greatly complicate any possible attempt by Israel todeliver a knock out blow to Iran’s nuclear facilities. The forthcoming February 10, 2009, legislative elections in Israel will be critical to its future posture.

Some analysts have speculated the possible military options being used by Israel or the US to cut off Iran’s nuclear capability. To counter this, Iran has reportedly acquired S-300 long range SAM system from Russia, in addition to shorter range TOR-M1 SAMs. Iranian sources have also indicated that Iran could retaliate in a variety of ways in case of a military strike against it.

The strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities seems to be an increasingly unreliable and dangerous option. A military conflict involving Iran could have serious consequences for the entire region, including for India, and every effort must be made to avoid this.

Engaging with Iran

So far, diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement have proved elusive. Recently, the Bush administration softened its strategy to include some contacts with Iran. US engagement with North Korea, for example, had produced positive results. Obama has indicated a willingness to engage with Iran.

Meanwhile, China, France, Germany Russia, the UK, the US and the EU (EU+6) made a formal written proposal on June 16, 2008, embodying important assurances regarding Iran’s legitimate security concerns as well as promises of economic and technological cooperation. This proposal could become the core of a modus vivendi with Iran, especially under the Obama administration.

However, hardliners in Iran and Israel are on a collision course as far as the Israel-Palestinian conflict and Israel’s role in the region are concerned. Shia-dominated Iran has built up strong organisations in Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Gaza (Hamas), using its oil wealth. It challenges the Sunni Arab-led monarchies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia the custodian of Mecca and Medina, and the pro-US administration that is taking shape in Iraq. The tendency of Iran’s religious leadership, especially the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, to cast issues and regional conflicts in terms of religious antagonisms also poses difficult problems.

It is rather striking that in the absence of direct US-Iran official dialogue, there has been hardly any attempt at a track II dialogue process between these countries. Such a process could have thrown up some useful ideas and mechanisms of bridging differences and distrust, and should be encouraged.

The Obama administration faces an important challenge in its policy towards Iran, which could have far-reaching consequences for India as well. One hopes that the June 12, 2009, presidential elections in Iran will encourage moderates and provide some flexibility and scope for accommodation. The sharp drop in oil prices could also affect Iran’s economy and make the nuclear option more difficult to achieve.

Meanwhile, all possible efforts must be made to find a diplomatic solution that leads to Iran becoming a constructive player in the region. The proposal of the EU+6 offers a good basis for a negotiated settlement, respecting Iran’s legitimate rights and proud culture and people and its potential contribution to cooperation, prosperity and peace in the region.

(The author is former Ambassador to Cuba and Greece. blfeedback@thehindu.co.in)